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Abstract 
The Emissions Trading Scheme represents a new departure in the field of 
environmental policy-making in the EU.  With it, the EU has deployed a market-based 
instrument to meet its Kyoto Carbon Dioxide emissions reduction commitments.  This 
paper will account for its emergence as a concrete policy output.  It will first refer to 
the historical, ideational and interest-based logics which shaped its emergence, within 
the broader context of environmental policy-making in the EU.  Using an integrated 
institutionalist approach incorporating all three strands of institutionalist thought, it 
will therefore account for the sequencing of these different logics at different stages of 
the policy-making process, from agenda-setting through to implementation and 
evaluation.  Accordingly, it will be argued that this approach adds value in accounting 
for the change in logics which can often lead from good ideas unintentionally 
emerging as sub-optimal policies in the EU, as is the case with the first phase of the 
Emissions Trading Scheme. 
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Sequencing of logics; Institutionalism. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 The subject of the Study 
 
The Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is one of the most high profile policies 
instigated by the European Union in recent times. An innovative policy solution, it is a 
‘cap and trade’ mechanism, in which the total amount of Carbon Dioxide (CO2) 
emissions in heavy polluting industry is limited, and a framework is set up to permit 
the trading of emissions allowances, in order to award efficient emissions reductions 
processes, and punish those who continue to increase their level of emissions, under 
the principle of the ‘polluter pays’. In its relative infancy, the ETS was put into action 
on January 1, 2005, and the first phase is due to run until December 31, 2007.  
 
One cannot mention the ETS without almost immediately referring to the so-
called “Kyoto commitments”. As a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol, which is the plan 
of action laid out under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), the European Union (EU) has a collective commitment 
to reduce its total emissions of anthropogenic greenhouse gases (GHGs) to 8% below 
its 1990 levels, by 2012. The ETS is listed as a ‘flexibility mechanism’1 in Article 17 
of the Protocol, thus outlining it as a blueprint for a strategy for signatories to honour 
their commitments in mitigating the human causes of climate change. 
 
Despite its prominence as a policy option as stated in the Kyoto Protocol, the 
transition from policy idea to concrete policy output in the context of the EU is not a 
simple and straightforward story to tell. A number of factors must be taken into 
consideration: for instance, the European Commission was openly against this 
instrument, and in fact the emissions trading option was only included as Article 17 
due to intense US lobbying2 (Yamin, 1998). Other factors included the differing 
emissions reductions targets of different member states3; competitiveness concerns, 
such as that this policy may put excessive burdens on globally competing European 
                                                 
1 In addition to Joint Implementation (JI), which permits developed countries to meet their 
commitments by transferring clean technology to countries in the former Soviet Bloc; and Clean 
Development Mechanisms (CDM), the most controversial of all, as they involve financing similar 
projects in the developing world: the “cleanness” of these projects have been called into question by 
many environmental NGOs (cf Lohmann, 2006). 
2 Notwithstanding the US’ subsequent failure to ratify the Protocol. 
3 This ranged from Luxembourg, which has to reduce its emissions of GHGs by 28%, to Portugal, 
which is actually allowed to increase its emissions by 27%, reflecting the differing levels of economic 
development of, respectively, the wealthiest and poorest member states of the old EU-15 in terms of 
GDP per capita (www.oecd.org). 
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industry (Position Paper, International Federation of Industrial Energy Consumers, 
Ford Europe and Solvay, 2003); and finally, concerns of environmental groups, who 
felt that a scheme such as the ETS would be easily abused by “generous” governments 
over-allocating permits to domestic industry (WWF Report, 2005) or that they do not 
penalise polluters enough (Jordan et al, 2005: 491). 
 
1.2 The Relevance of the Study 
 
The ETS has emerged as a concrete policy in the EU policy milieu, despite the myriad 
barriers mentioned above. A new environmental policy instrument (NEPI) (Damro 
and Luaces, 2003: 253), it can provide an insight into how these new measures are 
devised, shaped and implemented in the complex multi-level system of governance 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2001), that characterises the EU. It departs from the focus on 
‘market cushioning’ (Sbragia, 2003: 128) that is characteristic of environmental policy 
up to now, as it is in fact applying principles of economic efficiency to tackle 
environmental problems. Effectively a market creation policy, or a ‘policy 
experiment’ (Buchner, et al, 2006: 2), it displays the difficulties in terms of learning 
and co-ordination when implementing untried policies in an international setting such 
as the EU; it offers lessons on how different priorities and norms are represented by 
different actors in the dense institutional setting, and how the subsequent institutional 
turf wars often lead to ‘lowest common denominator’ outcomes, or at least sub-
optimal policy outputs (Scharpf, 1999). It therefore can provide insights into how 
institutional logics, be they rational, sociological or historical, govern the EU policy 
process. The institutional framework is thus displayed as an intervening variable, and 
not merely a parameter or conduit through which agents bargain over relative 
preferences (Caporaso and Stone Sweet, 2001: 225). 
 
1.3 Purpose and Research Question 
 
The purpose of the study is thus to account for the emergence of the ETS as a concrete 
policy, as it can add to our knowledge about how the institutional framework of the 
EU works, specifically in the field of environmental policy. It allows us to account for 
‘task expansion’ (Zito, 1999) in the field of environmental policy, as it shows how 
member states often leave it to the Commission to legislate in this area, partly out of a 
lack of desire to shoulder the burden themselves, and partly out of the wish to gain a 
comparative advantage over competitors (ibid); furthermore, this division of labour 
between legislation and implementation can prove significantly problematic, 
especially with new policy instruments of which legislator and implementer have little 
experience. 
 
Thus, the research question is: 
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How can we account for the development of the Emissions Trading Scheme, and what 
does this case tell us about the patterns and changes of logics in the process of 
environmental policy-making in the EU? 
 
When addressing this question, it is necessary to account for the nature of the 
polity, that is, the macro-institutional setting, in which environmental policy in general 
has emerged during the evolution of the EU. The different actors in the institutional 
milieu will be described, and how their various institutional weights contribute to the 
creation of the balance of power that is discernible in the EU today. Secondly, the role 
of ideas will be analysed, and their influence as externalities which change the rules of 
the game when introduced into the policy debate. Finally, the various interests of 
individual and coalitions of member states, the Commission itself as a supranational 
actor, the European Parliament (EP), industry and environmental groups must be 
taken into consideration. These are all intertwined concepts, and no attempt will be 
made to keep them completely separate; rather, the paper will build its argument up 
from polity and actors, through ideas and interests, in order to give a full picture of the 
state of affairs. 
 
1.4 Theoretical and Methodological Framework 
 
The value of an institutionalist account of the policy-making process 
 
The processes of agenda setting, formulation, decision-making and finally 
implementation of any policy in the EU usually involves the interaction of different 
behavioural logics at different stages of the decision-making process. The policy-
making process can only be fully understood by investigating the predominance of 
different logics of political action at different stages of its cycle, be they logics of 
appropriateness or logics of consequences (March and Olsen, 1998: 952), or indeed 
historical logics stemming from the formation of the political venue – the polity – in 
the first place. 
 
Therefore, this paper will investigate the development of the ETS into a 
concrete policy output, utilising the theoretical insights provided by historical, 
sociological and rational choice institutionalism. The analytical value of this approach 
is based on the fact that historical, ideational and interest-based factors in their sum 
can offer an insight into how policy is made in a dense, multi-level and multi-actor 
institutional setting such as the EU. The analytical value-added comprises pinpointing 
the sequencing of the different logics deployed in the process. But what are the 
assumptions underlining these different strands of institutionalist thought? Let us 
investigate briefly so as to approach this analytical process with a clear theoretical 
model in mind. 
 
Historical institutionalism offers insights into the development of the polity 
itself over time, and the sequence of developments which have had the ‘unintended 
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consequence’ (Pierson, 1996) of favouring one institutional set-up over other 
possibilities, often resulting in ‘path dependence’ ‘lock-ins’ or ‘joint-decision traps’ 
(Scharpf, 1988), that is, sub-optimal policy outputs not far from the original status 
quo, or the continuation of policies and practices that have outgrown their utility. This 
is of relevance to the study of the history of environmental policy, as it can give an 
account of how intergovernmental and supranational tensions have forged the 
environmental policy-making process in the way it is currently. Thus, the 
development of the polity, as a political venue for the making of policy, can be 
understood better through this framework. As Pollack says, there is great explanatory 
potential in ‘applying historical institutionalist concepts with precision to predict and 
explain variation in the stability and path-dependence of EU institutions and policies 
over time’ (Pollack, 2004: 151). 
 
A sociological institutionalist account can help explain the role ideas play in 
the formulation of policies, thus it is of analytical value in all stages of the policy-
making. It can offer an insight into the ‘solution-driven problem-solving dynamic’ 
(Aus, 2006: 8). Institutional actors, making decisions in cases where this is a high 
level of uncertainty of outcome - a situation which is likely to occur in fields such as 
climate policy - are less interest-governed (Haas, 1992) and are therefore more open to 
ideational inputs from epistemic communities (ibid). In a similar vein, an institutional 
logic of appropriate action (March and Olsen, 1989) guides them towards looking for 
solutions within their own institutional toolkit, as is the case with the Commission 
using the idea of economic efficiency to reinvigorate its environmental policy, 
summarised under the rubric of sustainable development. Additionally, it can account 
for the socialisation processes involved in ‘policy transfer’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 
2000), as polity-to-polity transfers of policy ideas can often be sub-optimal as 
institutional actors are unfamiliar with the intricacies of the policy itself, due to its 
novelty, highlighting the link between learning and socialisation process. 
 
Finally, a rationalist account can help us understand the role domestic and 
institutional material interests play in the formulation, shaping and implementation of 
policy. It can add explanatory value in addressing the extent to which environmental 
policy is merely an outcome of the strategic interplay of different state and non-state 
interests, from setting the agenda to bargaining over the final piece of legislation. 
Actors are perceived as being ‘strategic utility-maximisers whose preferences are 
taken as given’ (Pollack, 2004: 139).  
 
This conceptualisation is in marked contrast to the assumptions underling 
sociological institutionalism. Accordingly, how these different logics interact and take 
precedence over each other at different stages of the policy process will provide an 
analytical thrust throughout this paper. As Olsen puts it, ‘the way lies ahead in 
integrating institutional dynamics, rather than choosing among them’ (Olsen, 2002: 
944). This paper uses this integrative theoretical framework thus, in discerning the 
sequencing of the different institutionalist logics used at different stages of the policy-
making process. 
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1.5 Methodology: The Case Study Approach 
 
The paper has a case study as its primary method of analysing the patterns of change 
in environmental policy-making. It focuses on the ETS as an example of this change. 
Therefore, it is a heuristic case study (Eckstein, 1975: 104) in order to “find out” how 
this is happening, interpreting the ETS as a case of this change. By first outlining the 
three principle factors - polity, ideas and interests – which govern this process, a solid 
theoretical framework will be built, based on an institutionalist analysis, in order to 
move ahead with analysing and explaining this case.  
 
As it is an analysis of the policy-making process, some form of order must be 
given to how this is achieved. Accordingly, the model outlined by Howlett and 
Ramesh (2003), based on earlier work by Brewer (1974), Jones (1984) and Anderson 
(1984), the Five Stages of the Policy Cycle, is of utility as an analytical tool in 
conducting the aforementioned case study. It involves dividing the process into five 
steps: 1) Agenda-setting, the process by which problems come to the attention of 
policymakers; 2) Policy Formulation, which refers to how policy options are 
formulated within by policymakers; 3) Decision-making, is the process by which 
policymakers adopt a particular course of action or inaction; 4) Policy 
Implementation, which relates to how policies are put into effect; and 5) Policy 
Evaluation, which refers to the processes by which the results of policies are 
monitored by both state and societal actors (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 13). 
 
This model will form a general heuristic device, although variations in 
vocabulary are used in different places. For instance, policy shaping is a term that can 
subsume both formulation and the earlier stages of decision-making, so it is a bridge 
of sorts, which is of worth when briefly discussing other cases in the first part of this 
paper.  
 
In relation to sources, official documents, speeches and commissioned reports 
by private consultancies are referred to, in order to discern the dynamics at play in the 
process of forming the ETS. In addition, the considerable body of secondary literature 
will be consulted to help in outlining the explanatory model which has been described 
in the previous part of this section; finally, articles from The Economist, will be 
consulted in relation to changes in the Carbon Market which has developed as a 
consequence of the ETS. 
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2. Polity-building and Policy-making: 
The growth of environmental policy in 
the European Union 
Before looking into the precise development of the ETS, an account of the 
development of environmental policy in the EU must be given, taking into 
consideration the development of the body of laws and the introduction of Treaty 
provisions specifically referring to issues of environmental protection. Also, it will be 
seen how the Commission has emerged as a central actor, but nevertheless the system 
is sufficiently diffuse to prevent its overall dominance. 
2.1 The Commission and the Member States: the 
struggle between supranationalism and sovereignty 
 
There was no official mention of the environment in the original Treaty of Rome. 
Nevertheless in the period between 1957 and 1973, there was considerable 
‘integration by stealth’ (Weale, quoted in Zito, 1999: 147) in the field of 
environmental policy, in the classical, neofunctionalist sense. This entailed linking 
environmental issues – during this era usually concerning noise- and exhaust 
emissions, and control of dangerous substances – to the functioning of the common 
market (Zito, 1999: 147). It was deemed that member states with lower environmental 
standards had the opportunity to gain an unfair advantage over competitors, and thus a 
harmonised system of environmental regulation was necessary, above all in relation to 
industrial production processes. There was a deep-seated functionalist logic at work 
here, as the need for legislative harmonisation in one area necessitated legislation in 
other, related areas; the Commission took seriously its role of guardian of the Treaty.  
 
Environmental awareness grew throughout the 1960s, culminating in the 1972 
United Nations Environmental Conference in Stockholm. In the spirit of the times, the 
Commission seized the opportunity to expand Community competences in this field, 
drawing up the First Environmental Action Plan (EAP) in 1973 (Jordan, 2005: 4-5). 
This is regarded as the beginning of the era of purposeful and co-ordinated European 
environmental policy, culminating in 1981 with the establishment of the Environment 
Directorate General (DG XI) (Jordan, 2005: 4). Throughout the 1970s, policy 
continued to develop in an incremental manner (Lenschow, 2005). 
 
However, to think that environmental policy was simply driven forward by the 
technocrats in the Commission during this era would be to over-simplify, as it would 
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entail disregarding other important developments such as the policy preference 
transformations which some member states underwent during this period. The 
‘greening’ of West German policy that took place in 1982 (Hildebrand, 1993: 28) led 
to a massive new weight being placed behind the environmental agenda in the 
Community. This led to the deepening of a process by which environmentally 
conscious member states, usually comprising Denmark, the Netherlands and now 
West Germany, sought to magnify their higher regulatory standards onto the European 
level. They did this in order to diminish the costs of compliance for their domestic 
industries, by having competing industries in other member states abide by the same 
rules, but also to steal a march on the same competitors in this regulatory ‘race to the 
top’ (Weale, 1996: 133). The Commission at times seemed to take on the role of a 
rubber-stamping body, as it became a pawn in this game, most notably in the case of 
the Large Combustion Plant Directive4 (Sbragia 1999; Weale, 1996; Jordan, 2005; 
Zito, 1999), when West Germany succeeded in transferring its own legislation, almost 
intact, into the Community acquis. This was in contrast to member states such as the 
United Kingdom and Italy, who did not place such a high priority on environmental 
standards at the time.  
 
The Commission’s status as an environmental actor was solidified at the end of 
what Hildebrand calls the ‘responsive’ phase by the advent of the Single European 
Act (SEA) in 1987. The SEA introduced Title VII (the ‘environmental title’) into the 
Treaty, and thus opened up a whole new course of action under Article 1305 
(Hildebrand, 1993: 34-35). This title had symbolic importance in the sense that it 
enshrined environmental protection as a Community goal in itself, and thus left the 
Commission as the guardian of this norm. On the other hand, it introduced the 
principle of subsidiarity in the field of environmental policy, which determines 
whether appropriate action is to be taken at the Community or at the member states 
level (ibid. 35). The SEA also introduced the procedure of Qualified Majority Voting 
(QMV) in most matters of environmental policy, with some exceptions being the issue 
of fiscal measures (a failed policy preference of the Commission in the 1990s to tackle 
climate change, as will be discussed in the case study section) and decisions on 
appropriate energy mixes for individual member states being left under the unanimity 
procedure (Article 175 (2) TEC). From a purely institutional perspective, this gave the 
Commission far more powers as it strengthened the ‘organisational mandate’ of pro-
environment actors such as DG XI (Zito, 1999: 153).  
 
Therefore, what can be seen to be happening here is the development of an 
environmental policy in the Europolity, which had the effect of institutionalising a 
concern for environmental protection in the supranational institutions, whilst 
nevertheless guarding state sovereignty in sensitive areas such as taxation, as outlined 
above. Now it is necessary to look at the role of the other supranational actors, the 
European Parliament and the European Court of Justice. 
 
                                                 
4 84/360/EEC 
5 Now Title XIX, Articles 174-176 in the consolidated Treaty. 
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2.2 The European Parliament and the European 
Court of Justice: the ‘environmental champion’ and 
the standard bearer of environmental regulation 
 
Throughout the history of the EU, there has been consistent complaints that 
democratic oversight has been notable by its absence, in the government and 
Commission-driven legislative process. However, the European Parliament has come 
to represent this oversight. Although being directly elected for the first time in 1979 
(Bomberg, et al, 2003: 56), it only really achieved real powers under the SEA in 1987, 
when it was given powers under the ‘co-operation procedure’ whereby it could send 
legislative proposals it did not like back to the Commission, who then had to amend 
them or else allow them to lapse (ibid: 59). Finally, in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, 
it gained the power of ‘co-decision’ with the Council of Ministers, which entails that it 
now formally shares legal responsibility with the Council under the ‘Community 
method’ (ibid: 56). The main example of the EP imposing its environmental influence 
is in the Car Emissions standards, when it tipped the institutional balance in favour of 
stricter standards (Hubschmid and Moser, 1997). 
 
What are the consequences for the balance of power in the EU, especially in 
relation to environmental policy? Well, the EP is seen to be an ‘environmental 
champion’ (Burns, 2005: 87), which means another interest is now represented in 
environmental policy, as the Environment Committee has set its stall out as an 
advocate of those affected by pollution (ibid). The interests of this actor will be fully 
laid out below in the context of the analysis of different actor preferences. 
 
Although not of particular relevance in the case of the ETS, the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) has been an important actor in the context of environmental 
policy for two principle reasons. Firstly, it has ruled in favour of the Commission and 
against the Council in numerous rulings, the most recent of which concluded the 
Commission was acting within its powers to pursue criminal proceedings against 
environmental offences6, against the wishes of the majority of member states. What 
this means is that the ECJ acts to shore up the powers of the Commission in this area, 
thus increasingly its institutional weight vis-à-vis actors with a more 
intergovernmental preference for environmental policy-making, such as some member 
states (see below).  
 
A second example of the ECJ acting to bolster environmental policy is in its 
rulings in favour of the right of individual member states to impose even higher 
environmental standards than those existent in Community law (ibid: 93). An instance 
of this occurred when in it ruled in favour of the Danish government imposing strict 
controls on the size and shape of recyclable bottles, something which non-Danish beer 
and soft-drink companies regarded as a barrier to free competition7. 
                                                 
6 Commission v. Council C176/03 
7 Commission v Denmark C302/86 
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 2.3 The Europolity and environmental policy: a case 
of ‘task expansion’ 
 
Viewing the history of the development of environmental policy in the EU in parallel 
with the development of the polity itself, it can be seen that as the EU itself increased 
its scope and complexity, so did environmental policy. Thus, the existence of an 
institutional framework which favours the increasing use of environmental regulation 
has been created, with heavy institutional hitters such as the EP working in favour of 
this goal, alongside the Commission, the ‘green’ member states, bolstered by the 
rulings of the ECJ; nevertheless, the member states have retained considerable 
sovereignty in this area (as in others) by refusing to hand over issues of taxation to the 
Community. In light of this, the historical development of the institutional balance of 
power has created a systemic leaning towards smaller, regulatory measures, rather 
than non-regulatory measures such as taxation and emissions trading. Accordingly, an 
account of the possible limits and negative consequences of attempt to move away 
from these ‘path dependencies’ (Scharpf, 1999) will inform the case study of the ETS 
below, as we attempt to account for patterns of continuity and change in this policy 
sector.  
 
As Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch (2001: 101) stated, ‘polity determines, 
politics and policy’. In the light of what has been described above, this paper argues 
that this is partially true. Nevertheless, the historical bias of the polity is but one 
(albeit important) factor which shapes the outcomes of policy. Therefore, it is 
necessary to look at two other factors: ideas and interests, before a holistic view can 
be taken of the development of a policy such as the ETS within the EU system of 
governance. 
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3. Environmental Action Plans, Climate 
Change and the EU: the influence of the 
ideas on the institutional framework 
Up until now, this paper has focused on the tension between the various actors that has 
led to the development of environmental policy in the EU, as we know it today. As it 
were, this is an exercise in the definition of polity. The history of environmental 
policy has been used as a demonstrative case of how this polity has emerged and 
formulated a large corpus of policy in the environmental sector. Now that this has 
been outlined, it is necessary to examine another crucial factor in the creation of 
policy, namely ideas. Climate change policy will be increasingly referred to as an 
example, in the lead up to the case study towards the end of this paper.  
 
3.1 Why focus on ideas? 
 
There are a number of reasons for focussing on ideational factors as causal variables. 
Firstly, climate change policy, as a subfield of environmental policy, is a relatively 
new concern. The threat of climate change caused by anthropogenic GHGs only 
became apparent as scientific evidence was being accumulated in the 1980s, and thus 
it was not an “out there” or easy to observe problem, as was acid rain in previous 
decades. As Haas says, 
 
In the case of international environmental issues, decision makers are seldom certain of 
the complex interplay of components of the ecosystem and are therefore unable to 
anticipate the long-term consequences of measures designed to address one of the many 
environmental issues under current consideration (Haas, 1992: 13).  
 
Therefore, it is necessary to focus on how this idea was constituted as a 
problem that needed to be addressed, in the process providing a foundation for the 
development of policy.  
 
Secondly, ideas about the general function of government undoubtedly have 
transformative effects in relation to selection of policy instruments, in the 
environmental sector as elsewhere. The so-called economisation of Commission 
environmental policy (Damro and Luaces, 2003) which has occurred in recent years 
also needs to be addressed, as it provides another insight into how ideational factors 
have causal implications. 
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Finally, the power of ideas in the form of policy innovations (ibid) and their 
role in policy transfers (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000), in affecting the policy paradigm 
within a polity has to be analysed, as this can in some ways account for the learning 
processes that the Commission underwent during the 1990s in relation to climate 
change policy.  
 
3.2 The Science of Climate Change and its ideational 
impact 
 
At this stage of analysis, what is being investigated here is how external factors “plug 
in” to the policy receiving nodes of the polity, in order to infuse the policy paradigm 
with new ideas. This ideational input could be termed a bottom-up externality, as it 
arises out of society in the form of the scientific community, to influence the policy-
making options of elite policy-makers. This is the case with the development of a 
concern for mitigating climate change amongst policymakers, and will thus be 
addressed below. 
 
As Rayner states,  
 
Issues such as stratospheric ozone depletion, climate change, and global biodiversity did 
not originate in public experience. Rather than science confirming public perceptions of 
danger, in these cases, scientists have formulated the perceptions of danger and sought to 
persuade politicians and the public of the need for policy measures (Rayner, 2006: 4). 
 
Accordingly, climate change policy has been pushed to the top of the agenda 
by the work of scientists, but how did they get their ideas on to the public policy 
platform? One must look here to the interplay of ‘advocacy coalitions’ and ‘epistemic 
communities’ to find answers about how ideas are converted into institutions.  
 
In order to understand this causal factor, a brief discussion of epistemic 
communities is necessary. An epistemic community is  
 
a network of professionals with recognised expertise in a particular domain and policy-
relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area. They have a shared set of normative 
and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of 
community members (Haas, 1992: 3).  
 
But what role do they play in the policy-making process? In summary, they 
can be seen to make four key contributions to this process. Firstly, they define cause 
and effect relationships; secondly, they shed light on complex interlinkages between 
issues and outline the consequences of not taking action; thirdly, they can help define 
self-interests of a state or factions within it, and finally, they help formulate policies 
(ibid: 16). Therefore, epistemic communities can be understood as idea seeders, in that 
they seed the policy paradigm with new ideas, concerns, or potential dangers which 
policymakers have to address. In the case of climate change, it is the overwhelming 
scientific knowledge which has been accumulated to display that humans have an 
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influence in the process of global warming (Oreskes, 2003), which has provided the 
idea seed for the numerous suite of policies which have begun to emerge over the past 
decade or so, the ETS being amongst the most high profile. 
 
Thus, epistemic communities, such as that comprising the body of scientists 
concerned with the effects of anthropogenic GHG emissions on the global climate, 
provides an ideational “plug-in point” for policy entrepreneurs (acting in combination 
with institutional self-interest, as will be discussed in the next section). They open a 
‘policy window’ (Kingdon, in Ramesh and Parekh, 2003: 135), through which new 
ideas can pass through to become policies. Policy entrepreneurs can thus utilise these 
ideas to build ‘advocacy coalitions’ (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). These 
coalitions, which can be motivated by more than one normative or instrumental belief, 
nevertheless have the original idea developed by the epistemic community as a 
touchstone. Thus, ‘provocative’ (Haas, 1992: 27) as it may be, it is argued here that 
ideas do to a certain extent inform policy, especially complex technical policy that is 
highly reliant on the informational and heuristic expertise of the natural science 
community. They undoubtedly play their part in changes in the patterns of policy-
making in the EU, especially in the area of environmental policy. This can specifically 
be noticed in the agenda-setting stage of the policy-making process, as will be seen 
below. Now it is necessary to look at a second ideational factor that has had 
transformative effects: the changes in ideas of optimum policy instruments which the 
Commission took on board during the 1990s. 
 
3.3 New governance ideas in the EU: economisation 
processes in EU environmental policy. 
 
Throughout the 1990s there has been a continual debate as to the merits of the 
traditional ‘command and control’ regulation used by the Commission, especially in 
the area of environmental policy, where higher standards, and the unintended 
consequences of harmonisation, have led to increased costs for producers, and have 
been seen to become a stifling influence on economic matters. As Jordan (2005: 14) 
puts it, ‘of the three main modes of policy co-ordination (markets, hierarchies and 
networks), the Commission is under political pressure to make significantly less use of 
one of there (hierarchy) by adopting less regulation’. This is often what is referred to 
in popular opinion as the need to cut EU ‘red tape’. There are plenty of examples that 
need not be listed here, as they are so well-known in popular consciousness.  
 
Due then to the apparent limits of command-and-control regulation, and other 
concerns such as its negative legitimacy impacts on the EU, there has been an upsurge 
in new environmental policy instruments (NEPIs) at EU level in the past fifteen or so 
years (Jordan et al, 2005). This was informed by a general shift from ‘government’, or 
hierarchical command and control, to ‘governance’, which is assumed to ‘allow social 
actors more freedom to coordinate amongst themselves in pursuit of societal goals, 
with far less (or even no) central government involvement’ (ibid: 481).  
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These ideas of governance are having an effect on the policy that is being 
produced by the EU in the field of environmental policy, such as the use of Voluntary 
Agreements (VAs), Eco-labels, and of course, Emissions Trading, to achieve its 
policy goals (ibid). But from where are these ideas emerging?  
 
These ideational inputs could be termed, in line with the typology briefly 
referred to in the previous section, as internally generated, as it comes from a general 
reappraisal from within the Commission as to how to conduct policy in this sector. 
 
There are a number of possible sources of this ideational shift. Firstly, the 
policies themselves are motivated by a genuine desire to be less intrusive, due to 
industry and the general public’s regulation fatigue as mentioned above. There is a 
distinctively economistic idea propping this argument up. Heavy regulation stifles 
innovation, so instruments which are market-based and/or voluntary provide the 
economic incentive for companies and individuals to diminish their environmental 
impact in a cost-effective or transparent manner, rather than being ‘coerced’ by big 
government. This could arguably also be linked to a cultural shift away from the 
German model of traditionally regulation-heavy policy to a more co-operative and 
voluntary approach, based on the British model of policy-making in this sector 
(Börzel, 2002: 166). 
 
This is revealed in the general shift in rhetoric from the Commission away 
from appealing to people’s sense of good behaviour, in favour of appealing to their 
self-interest. Mirroring the aphorism that it is better to appeal to a businessman’s 
pocket than to his conscience, perhaps.  
 
Secondly, there was a process of learning which the Commission was 
undergoing, which will be discussed below. 
 
Finally, there was a perceived need to link up environmental policy with other 
policy sectors, as the effects of policies in other areas such as agriculture and transport 
could have significant consequences for the environmental policy. Therefore this idea 
was summarised under the rubric of ‘sustainable development’ and was explained in 
detail in the Fourth and Fifth EAPs (Zito, 1999: 153), culiminating in its inclusion in 
the text of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 (Collier, in Lighfoot and Burchell, 2004: 
338). This emphasis on both the words sustainable, which has overtones of 
environmental protection, and development¸ which connotes economic growth and 
increased prosperity, gives an important clue as to the increasing synthesis of these 
two logics in the field of environmental policy-making; this will be referred to when 
discussion the official rhetoric emanating from the Commission in the run-up to the 
implementation of the ETS, in the case study section below. 
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3.4 Policy Transfer – lessons learned from abroad 
 
Having analysed the ideational impact of scientific advance and governance reform on 
the (re)formulation and reappraisal of environmental policy within the EU, it is now 
appropriate to analyse how policy ideas are transferred across polities (Dolowitz and 
Marsh, 2000; Damro and Luáces, 2003). This form of ideational input could be termed 
a horizontal externality, as it refers to the process by which policy ideas are copied or 
‘lessons are learned’ (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, in Damro and Luáces, 2003). As 
Dolowitz and Marsh state, ‘policy-makers increasingly look to other political systems 
for knowledge and ideas about institutions, programs and policies and about how they 
work in other jurisdictions’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 7). 
 
In analysing why policies are transferred, Dolowitz and Marsh model a 
continuum, starting with voluntary transfer and continuing to coercion, with ‘mixed’ 
motive in between (ibid: 9). Thus, we have numerous situations whereby polities 
adopt policies because ‘they want to’, ‘it seems appropriate to do’ and because ‘they 
have to’. The beginning is thus governed by agency; the middle by a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 1989), and the final part is governed by 
structurally enforced obligations, such as international agreements. The weight of 
ideas based motives concomitantly recedes from high in the first case, to low in the 
last, as interest-based concerns induce the transfer.  
 
An agency-based perspective on the transfer of ideas across policies would 
focus on the concept of ‘international best practice’. It is within the adoptive polity’s 
interest to assimilate these new ideas as they may lead to the better solution of societal 
problems in the polity in question. This can be seen with the adoption of US ‘welfare-
to-work’ policies by the UK government in the 1990s (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 
15). 
 
A mixed perspective could see the transfer of ideas through a process of 
emulation. At first sight this may appear a mere mirror of the ‘agency-based’ 
rationale, but in fact it is more to do with the ‘bounded rationality’ (inter alia Simon, 
1983, cited in Müller, 2004) of copying one’s neighbours, in order to be seen to be 
equally as competent in solving societal problems. Rather than transferring the policy 
instrument out of a purely instrumental rationale, there is a social rationale which is 
obvious here. This is predominantly the case in the area of international human rights 
(Björkdahl, 2002; Manners, 2002), whereby countries are often positively encouraged 
to reform by leading the good example shown by ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (Björkdahl, 
2002), rather than out of a need to reform based on societal demand. 
 
A coercive transfer may involve the requirement to fulfill agreements made at 
the international level, or to comply with loan conditions made by international 
organisations, and so on (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 16). The concept of emissions 
trading was coercively inserted into the Kyoto Protocol, as it formed a sine qua non 
condition for US negotiators for agreement on the climate deal at Kyoto, the upshot of 
which the EU got commitments to strict timetables for action, and concrete emissions 
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reductions included in the text (Yamin, 1998; Damro and Luáces, 2003). 
Nevertheless, it was an optional mechanism to meet the emissions reduction 
commitments, therefore it would lie in the middle of the abovementioned contiuum. 
 
Also of relevance is the relationship between the way policy ideas are 
transferred and their relative success, as policy failures or sub-optimal policy outputs 
can often be attributed to this process. Dolowitz and Marsh refer to ‘uninformed 
transfer’ in which policies are borrowed in despite the lack of information about how 
they are to be correctly implemented; ‘inappropriate transfer’, whereby social, 
economic and ideological conditions may differ too much from polity to polity in 
order for the policy to have the same success rate in both; and ‘incomplete transfer’, in 
which crucial elements which made the policy a success in its original setting are not 
implemented. All of these factors can result in the only partial success or total failure 
of the policies transferred. This, therefore, is an example of a clash of ideational logics 
and historical logics, as a polity may not have the experience to deal with the policy 
transfer. This is of particular relevance to the case study at the end of this paper, as 
arguably all of these transfer-related problems listed above have had implications for 
the success of the ETS in its first phase. 
 
3.5 Ideas and their impact 
 
This section of the paper has not explicitly argued that ideas - be they 
scientific, governance-related or policy-specific – are the primary causal factors in the 
rate of change in environmental policy-making in the EU; nevertheless, they provide 
one pillar on which to base an explanatory model as to how this dynamic process of 
change evolves. As has been mentioned, how ideas are introduced into the policy 
paradigm can have crucial impacts on the success or failure of future policy outputs, 
notwithstanding whether they are bottom-up externalities, internal contributions or 
horizontal externalities. They are of importance in setting the agenda, and also in the 
implementing phase of the policy process. Oftentimes, it is the incomplete 
implementation of a good idea, for reasons of historical inexperience or due to the 
weight of vested interests in the system, which can often precipitate sub-optimal 
policies. The following section will now refer to the third pillar of this explanatory 
model, namely the role interests – national, societal and institutional – play in the 
patterns of continuity and change in the environmental policy-making. 
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4. Interests, Strategies and Coalitions in 
the Environmental Policy Sector 
4.1 The bottom line of policy-making? 
 
Who or what group of actors wants environmental policy to be made in the way it is in 
the EU? What interest do they have in its formulation, shaping and implementation? 
Are they utility maximizing strategic actors, or are they subjected to the ‘bounded 
rationality’ of the dense institutional framework? This section will thus outline the 
predominant pattern of preferences in the field of environmental policy, as the 
fluctuating patterns of interests in a densely institutionalized system such as the EU 
needs to be understood in order to understand the changing patterns of policy-making 
in the polity. It will start by referring to the interests of different member states and 
how complex two-level games (Putnam, 1988) with domestic societal interests often 
entail that member states’ interests are not as fixed – or as principled - as is assumed 
in the conventional wisdom, especially in the case of states such as Germany 
(Liefferink and Andersen, 1998). It will then discuss the interest formation within the 
European institutions and how these are often formed as much a consequence of 
institutional self-interest as of genuine environmental concern. Finally, how sectoral, 
tactical and often loose groupings of both member states and supranational institutions 
bring about interest coalitions (Börzel, 2002) will be discussed; it will be thus 
displayed that cleavage in environmental policy-making is not merely two-
dimensional (Lenschow, 2005: 315) as is often simplistically put, as different member 
states, Commission DGs and EP Committees have different priorities in different 
areas of environmental policy, and thus the potential alignments operate over many 
dimensions; however, despite some fluctuations, there are some actors who will time 
and again act more greenly than others.  
 
4.2 Member State interests 
 
There undoubtedly exists a ‘green core’ of member states within the EU (Liefferink 
and Andersen, 1998; Börzel, 2002). Usually considered to consist of Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, and to a certain extent Germany, it is often 
taken for granted that these states will automatically favour more, rather than less, 
environmental policy output at the EU-level. On the other hand, the ‘poorer’, southern 
member states of Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, along with the nouveau riche 
Ireland and the twelve new members states of Central and Eastern Europe, Malta and 
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Cyprus, are considered, by dint of their economy, society and geography, to have 
lower expectations or different priorities when it comes to environmental policy 
(Weale, 1996), compared to the wealthy and highly regulated northern countries, a 
group which the UK is increasingly aspiring to, especially when it comes to the use of 
NEPIs, as described above. Despite the apparent divide, the divisions are not always 
so two-dimensional, as has been mentioned above, and coalitions can often be issue-
specific (Liefferink and Andersen, 1998: 262). 
 
Let us first look at the interest-formation of the ‘green’ states and how they 
contribute to EU environmental policy-making. An understanding of state-society 
relations and a consideration of geography and economic history (Weale, 1996: 134), 
and the two-level games (Putnam, 1988) played by governments with their domestic 
interest groups are necessary to understand how green interests are formed. The green 
states are generally relatively rich, highly regulated and have long histories of 
industrial development (and the pollution that this brings with it) in comparison to the 
‘other’ member states in the out-group. In line with their level of wealth, producers 
and consumers are more open to higher regulation – and thus higher marginal costs – 
in return for higher environmental standards (Börzel, 2002: 196-7). Taking their 
history of industrialisation and pollution, their high population density (in the case of 
the Netherlands and Germany) and public demand reflected in relatively popular 
green political parties, regulatory policy is popular and accepted amongst the public 
(Liefferink and Andersen, 1998; Börzel, 2002).  
 
Accordingly, it is in the interests of green states to instrumentally maximise 
the benefits of their high environmental standards, in three ways, as outlined by 
Börzel. Firstly, they recognize the limits to pollution-control within national 
boundaries, as many pollution problems, such as acid rain or river pollution, are 
transboundary in nature. Thus, they seek common policies at the EU level to address 
these issues (Börzel, 2002: 197). At first glance this may seem like a general 
normative concern, but the instrumental worth of catering to domestic constituencies 
who demand action in this area cannot be underestimated. 
 
Secondly, in order to ensure their high standards are not diluted by the 
overriding logic of market liberalisation driven by the EU, it is in their interests to 
seek to ‘upload’ their policies onto the European level of governance (Börzel, 2002: 
196). Thirdly, by achieving this policy upload, domestic industry gains a comparative 
advantage over competitors in less green states, as they have to make up the lost 
ground, resulting in higher compliance costs and decreased competitiveness for the 
latter (ibid; Weale, 1996: 134). 
 
These final two perspectives on interest-formation will be of great analytical 
worth when addressing the relatively surprising ‘greenness’ of some traditionally non-
green member states, and vice versa in the case of some green member states, in 
relation to the ETS, as Germany was a notable sceptic on the issue of emissions 
trading (Wettestad, 2005). 
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As regards the ‘non-green’ member states, it can be said that environmental 
concerns are relatively low down the domestic agenda, and thus there is no urgency on 
the part of national representatives in the Council of Ministers to advocate 
environmental policies at the EU. Working on the conventional assumption that higher 
environmental regulation imposes extra costs on producers and consumers, they are 
worried that their economic competitiveness and growth – structurally fragile in the 
cases of Greece, Italy, Portugal and many Eastern European countries – will be 
undermined in the rush to impose higher standards across the board.  
 
Another factor which must be addressed is the geographical one. Southern 
member states do not face the same environmental challenges (acid rain, river 
pollution and other side-effects of long-term heavy industrialization) that northern 
member states do (Weale, 1996: 134). Accordingly, some issues of concern for them, 
such as water supply, are not high up the agenda, as it is not a concern of northern 
member states, a fact which the southern member states might regard as ‘greenwash’ 
(Lightfoot and Burchell, 2004), that is environmentalism based on dubious ethical 
arguments or double standards, that might come across as mere rhetoric. 
 
One might ask, how are the interests of the non-green member states served by 
the existence of an extensive corpus of environmental policy? Why do they not simply 
veto it? The related concepts of package deals and side-payments (Scharpf, 1999: 169) 
is of heuristic value here: rather than agreeing to ship the higher relative marginal 
costs implicit in environmental regulation without recompense, they instead receive 
payments in the form of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Cohesion Policy 
transfers, thus lightening the burden of regulation that economic and environmental 
regulatory integration impose (Sbragia, 2003: 128). The issue of side-payments is also 
of significance when it comes to Kyoto implementation, as the traditionally poorer 
member states do not have to reduce absolute quantities of emissions relative to their 
1990 levels, under the principle of burden-sharing enshrined in Article 4 of the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
 
A clue as to how the ETS reflects changing patterns of environmental policy-
making in the EU is discernible in the previous two points made, as some southern 
and eastern member states were considerably more enthusiastic about emissions 
trading than the traditional ‘green’ coalition, demonstrating that environmental policy-
making is not so two-dimensional as what it is often taken for being. 
 
4.3 The Commission’s interests and its interaction 
with European level Interest Groups – output 
legitimacy and bureaucratic promiscuity 
 
It is not only member states that have interests which they jealously seek to guard, 
whether they follow a logic of appropriateness or a logic of consequences. The 
Commission also has its own interests, although they are perhaps more nuanced than 
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those of the member states. What constitutes its institutional interests? The first and 
most blatantly obvious one is that the Commission’s primary interest is in guarding 
the goals of the Treaty, that is, designing legislation in line with the broader Treaty 
goals such as the completion of the internal market, or environmental protection, and 
ensuring the implementation of EU law, for which it depends on national or regional 
governments and administrations (Lenschow 2005).  
 
Intimately linked with this interest, then, is the interest to maintain high 
standards of practice (output legitimacy), and also to maintain its relevance as a 
central actor in the policy-making process. Environmental policy has been targeted by 
the Commission as a high profile case of its effectiveness in working for European 
citizens (cf Information and Communication Strategy for the EU, 2002); therefore 
increasing the Commission’s role in this policy area can serve to highlight its worth, 
and generate output legitimacy, amongst public opinion. 
 
What are the implications of these factors for the policy-making process? The 
first implication is that the Commission often seeks to depart as far as possible from 
the status quo at the policy formulation stage, when designing Proposals and Green 
Papers, in order to attain, in its opinion, the highest quality legislation possible, as it is 
well aware that its proposal will be subsequently subject to watering down, especially 
when its proposals have significant potential cost implications for industry.  
 
A second implication is that, in order to obtain the highest level of legitimacy 
in the view of public opinion and national governments, it resorts to ‘bureaucratic 
promiscuity’ (Mazey and Richardson, 2001). That is, it seeks to encourage the 
consultation and participation of private interest groups in the policy-making process 
(ibid). Along with its concern for being legitimate, it also draws considerable 
information (which is in many ways related to the ideational factors previously 
outlined) and support from these groups, thus increasing its resource capacity, 
something which is quite important when one considers its limited staffing 
arrangement vis-à-vis larger member states (Bomberg, et al, 2003: 48). Interest 
groups, for their part, get to play a (possibly disproportionately) key role in shaping 
policy, which completes the feedback loop of legitimacy, as interest groups such as 
industry federations and environmental NGOs are satisfied with their level of input 
(Mazey and Richardson, 2001). As Weale puts it,  
 
many apparently small technical changes in the rules can turn out to have major cost or 
environmental implications, so that the involvement of interest groups in the processes of 
standard-setting and rule-making should not be regarded as trivial or simply as a matter 
of courtesy (Weale, 1996: 136). 
 
Up until now, the Commission and interest groups have been analysed without 
taking into consideration sectoral differences (Egeberg, 2005: 8). However, 
considerable conflicts of interest exist between different Directorates General (DG) 
within the Commission, which nevertheless must make all decisions collegiately, 
reaching an internal consensus of all twenty-seven sectoral Commissioners before 
publishing policy proposals (Bomberg, et al, 2003: 48). Therefore, DG Environment 
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will often come into conflict with DG Industry, reflecting the fact that each DG 
defends its own part of the institutional and sectoral ‘turf’. The relative influence of 
different Commissioners, along with the preferences of the President of the 
Commission, can play a decisive role in which way the balance of the intra-
institutional compromise tilts (Egeberg, 2005: 7). 
 
Thus, along with being a crucial ideational plug-in point, as described in the 
previous section of this paper, the Commission also serves as a battleground for 
differing interest groups who seek to shape Commission proposal to reflect their own 
strategic preferences. The Commission’s promiscuity undoubtedly aids this process. 
Now it is necessary to look at the interests of the EU’s legislature, the EP. 
 
4.4 The European Parliament 
 
The interest formation of the EP mirrors in many ways that of the Commission, as it is 
sectorally divided in the form of different Committees, (such as the Environment 
Committee); it has limited capacity to analyse the significant amount of technical 
legislation in the field of environmental policy making (Burns, 2005: 99); therefore, it 
has to be quite ‘promiscuous’ when it comes to consulting interest groups, especially 
in the case of environmental NGOs (ibid). As described in section 2 of this paper, its 
competence in this field has expanded considerably over the years, and it now sees 
itself as ‘an environmental champion’ (ibid). Accordingly, it seeks to throw its 
institutional weight around, thus legitimating itself in the eyes of its electorate, as a 
protector the general interest, against polluting big industry, as was the case with the 
Auto-Oil Programme, in which Environment Committee rapporteur Ken Collins 
played a key role in forging an environmentally-friendly agreement (ibid). 
 
Nevertheless, the consensual nature of decision-making in the EP (no political 
group has an overall majority) renders it unlikely to propose radical amendments to 
legislation (ibid). Despite this, the Greens are able to muster considerable resources 
for issues they consider of high priority due to the points system of allocating 
Committee chairs, along with their position as fourth largest parliamentary grouping 
(ibid).  
 
The EP has traditionally been active in the decision-making stage of the 
policy-making process, in the form of issuing opinions after first, second or third 
readings (ibid). Nevertheless, in co-decision sectors they have started issuing own 
opinion reports for the attention of the Commission, and in general have sought to 
informally set the agenda by arranging conferences of experts in particular fields. In 
this way they have an informal right of setting the agenda, so that they can better 
represent their institutional interests. 
 
In the case of the ETS, the EP was manifestly passive, perhaps due to the sheer 
technical complexity of the issue (Wettestad, 2005) and also due to the possibility that 
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they were quite satisfied with the seeming environmental progressiveness of the 
Commission’s legislative proposal. Bearing this in mind, it is necessary to move on to 
talk about another feature of interest representation in the EU: the formation of trans-
institutional and trans-actor sectoral coalitions. 
 
4.5 Coalitions of interests in the EU 
 
There are indeed certain actors in the EU milieu who are ‘greener’ than others. 
The northern states are generally greener than their southern and eastern neighbours; 
DG Environment is greener than DG Industry; the Environment Committee of the EP 
is greener than its Industry counterpart. Despite this, there is scope for issue-specific 
coalitions, as member states’ interests are not as fixed as the ‘green’-‘non-green’ 
model would have one believe, although there is a discernible alignment along these 
lines in general. Nevertheless, it is of explanatory worth, and it also can be of aid in 
understanding the links that occur between DG Environment, the Environment 
Committee and member states such as Sweden or Denmark. The abovementioned 
Auto-Oil and Car Emissions standards were examples of this coalition formation in 
the environmental sector, so there is considerable empirical evidence that this occurs. 
It will be noted in the case study how the EP gave its tacit consent to the proposals of 
the Commission, thus speeding up the legislative process (Wettestad, 2005). Therefore 
coalitions are of utility, but their stable formation cannot be guaranteed, especially 
considering the fact the Commission was set against the EP and member states such 
as the Netherlands and Germany in the case of the Car Emissions standard 
(Hubschmid and Moser, 1997; Burns, 2005).  
 
4.6 Polity, ideas and interests matter at different stages of the policy-
making process 
 
To conclude the first half of this paper, the historical development of the polity 
has been accounted for, to display the development of patterns of environmental 
policy-making over time and how this has affected the potential to act in some areas, 
such as regulatory policy, and not in others, such as fiscal policy. Secondly, the role of 
ideas in the development of environmental policy has been analysed. Ideational 
factors are crucial in a sector that relies so much on technical knowledge; likewise, the 
Commission must constantly reassess its priorities and thus come up with new ideas 
on how to attain broader goals such as sustainable development. Furthermore, the 
influence of policies that can be transferred from other polities has been accounted for.  
 
Finally, the role of instrumental interests, and how they are elaborated at the 
European level have been discussed. Instrumental bargaining has a key role to play in 
the latter stages of the policy-making process, that is, in the decision-making and 
implementation stages, as actors begin to realise the distributive implications of new 
policies, and react accordingly in order to maximise their relative gains or minimise 
relative losses, forming coalitions with other actors if needs be. There exists a general 
divide between ‘green’ and ‘non-green’ actors across member states, Commission 
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DGs and parliamentary Committees. Nevertheless, the instrumental nature of policy-
making suggests that these preferences are not always fixed, and can shift from issue 
to issue, as coalitions of interests are formed to achieve collective goals, perhaps 
motivated by different factors. Now it is necessary to delve deep into the policy-
making process, to look at how the ETS has emerged as a policy in this sector of the 
EU. It offers an opportunity to test which factors are most influential at which stages 
of the process; thereby the sequencing of instrumentally, historically and ideationally 
motivated actions can be accounted for, in the context of a broader institutional setting 
developed over the past fifty years. Also, it can allow us to account for possible 
changes in environmental policy-making as climate change policies come to the fore. 
Let us now look, therefore, at the development of the Emissions Trading Scheme. 
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5. Case Study: the Emissions Trading 
Scheme 
The ETS is the first real policy output after over a decade of attempts by the 
Commission, amongst other actors, to address climate change with concrete measures. 
To provide the most comprehensive analysis of the change this has represented in 
environmental policy-making in the EU, it is necessary to trace its development from 
the broader concern about climate change pushed onto the agenda by climatologists, 
which led to preliminary failed efforts to address this threat, such as the carbon tax 
initiative which was rejected by member states in the mid 1990s. Therefore, this study 
will proceed following the five stages set out by Howlett and Ramesh (2003): agenda-
setting, policy formulation, decision-making, policy implementation and policy 
evaluation. Nevertheless, it will not be so neatly linear, as an account for the failure of 
the carbon tax proposal is central to the understanding of the development of the ETS; 
hence its development too will be briefly referred to in the course of this analysis. 
 
5.1 Setting the Agenda: Ideas, international 
agreements and stillborn policies 
 
The first stage of policy-making, setting the agenda, sets out the problem that needs to 
be addressed by policymakers. As Howlett and Ramesh (2003) say, ‘the manner and 
form in which problems are recognized, if they are recognized at all, are important 
determinants of how they will ultimately be addressed by policymakers’ (2003: 120). 
The Emissions Trading Scheme can be seen as the most high-profile outcome of the 
EU’s climate change policy. It will be seen that an ideational logic is predominant in 
the agenda-setting stage in such a complicated policy sector such as climate change. 
Let us now look at how these ideas propelled the concern for climate protection onto 
the EU agenda.  
 
5.1.1 Climate Science and Climate Change 
 
In his history of global warming, Weart pinpoints the 1970s as a time when 
developments in computer technology allowed climatologists - previously a relative 
backwater of the broader science of geophysics – to model global climate patterns for 
the first time (Weart, 2006: 15). For the first time, scientists could get an idea of how 
changes and fluctuations in the global climate were occurring. Combined with 
information gleaned from ice-cores in Greenland, and increasing evidence that CO2 
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had a warming effect on the earth’s atmosphere, and finally, record temperatures and 
extensive droughts in the summer of 1988 (ibid), had the cumulative effect of 
propelling this global human security issue (Stripple, 2005) onto the agenda of most 
developed countries, including the European Community at the time. In light of these 
circumstances, the influence of ideas in setting the agenda for political action can be 
seen. This is evident in the fact that the call to action was a preventive call; there was 
no real sense amongst the general public about the issue being “out there”. Therefore, 
it was ‘sung into existence’ (ibid, 2005: 5) by the scientific community. Weart 
describes how concerned scientists combined efforts to raise awareness, making it into 
newspaper reports, and even more significantly, creating metaphors such as James 
Lovelock’s “Gaia hypothesis8” (Weart, 2006: 30). The concern percolated into public 
consciousness, and thus it came to the attention of policymakers. 
 
The Commission addressed the issue for the first time in 1988, with its first 
document published on the matter9, and it became officially recognized as a problem 
to be tackled under the terms of a Commission Work Programme (Damro and Luaces, 
2003: 260). By 1990, a commitment had been made to reduce CO2 levels by 2000 to 
the level in 1990, in a declaration by a joint Council of Energy and Environment 
Ministers (ibid). Therefore, the broader agenda was set by the EU to tackle this 
problem, leaving open a ‘policy window’ (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 120) for 
potential policy entrepreneurs to exploit. 
 
This process of agenda-setting displays the important influence of ideas at this 
stage of policy-making. The body of climatologists who brought this threat to the 
attention of the broader public and policymakers, represents an example of an 
epistemic community (Haas, 1992). This can be seen as a normative project, as they 
framed the issue (Björkdahl, 2002) and offered a plug-in point for receptive 
policymakers to take up the initiative. The institutional set-up of the European 
Community at the time, which had acquired official competence under Article 130 of 
the SEA-amended Treaty, as mentioned above, was receptive to such concerns. 
Accordingly, we see the historical factor of an environmentally friendly Treaty 
amendment was also of influence here, along with the nevertheless dominant 
ideational factor, provided by the epistemic community, which seeded the concern in 
the minds of policymakers, thus setting the agenda for action. 
 
5.2 Policy Formulation and (non)-Decision-making: 
the Carbon Tax Initiative 
 
                                                 
8 James Lovelock is a notable environmentalist who is the author of The Gaia Theory (1979) and The 
Ages of Gaia (1988), which consider the planet Earth as a self-regulated living being. 
9 European Commission, 1988. “The Greenhouse Effect and the Commission”. COM 88 (656), cited in 
Damro and Luaces, 2003: 79. 
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5.2.1 The Carbon Tax: a stillborn policy 
 
Formulating a policy involves the combination of good (or bad) ideas and the 
motivation of an actor to carry them through. The Commission took it upon itself to 
formulate a policy to tackle the perceived risk to the climate from human activity. It 
arguably sought to display, what Underdal (2002) terms ‘problem solving capacity’. 
We begin to see a changeover here from a purely ideational logic of policy-making - 
that is, calling attention to a problem based on considerable knowledge accumulated 
about the issue – to a logic of institutional self-interest, as the Commission moved 
possibly out of a motivation to set itself up as a responsible steward of the climate, 
thus adding to its body of environmental policy. 
 
In line with the particular appeal to the Commission, answering the call to 
action on climate change fitted in nicely with the Community’s self-image as a global 
leader in environmental affairs. There was a general belief in the EU at the time 
(especially amongst the ‘green’ member states) that industrialized countries had to 
take on special responsibilities to reduce emissions, as they historically constituted the 
dominants emitters of GHGs (Damro and Luaces, 2003).  
 
The Commission seized on the window of opportunity opened up by this 
change in events by formulating a proposal for a Community-wide carbon tax in 1992 
(Weale, 1996; Damro and Luaces, 2003; Jordan et al, 2003; Wettestad, 2005), within 
the context of the Fifth EAP, ‘Towards Sustainability’. This was also arguably 
prompted by Denmark in its ‘environmental activist’ role (Liefferink and Andersen, 
1998), which hoped to lead by example on this issue; it had unilaterally introduced a 
national carbon tax in 1993.  
 
5.2.2 Non-decision-making 
 
Nevertheless, the issue of using fiscal measures to tackle environmental problems is 
decided on a unanimous basis in the Council of Ministers (Article 175(2) TEC), so 
therefore it was shot down by Spain, Portugal, France, Greece, Ireland and the UK, for 
various reasons ranging from claims of cost to ideological grounds (Weale, 1996: 
132). However, it dragged on as a proposal within the Commission for a number of 
years, re-emerging as an energy tax in 1997, but it never reached the implementation 
stage (Wettestad, 2005: 12), perhaps reflecting a vain attempt by the latter to be seen 
to be doing something. It became the poster boy of failure to address climate change 
in a proactive, preventive way in the EU, and by the time of the Kyoto negotiations, it 
had led to a certain sclerosis in this policy area (ibid: 12). 
 
But what logics were dominant here? The Commission dominated the 
formulation process, but once it came to the decision-making stage, member state 
interests came to the fore, due to the facilitating role played by the historical logic of 
unanimity. The Commission sought to act progressively on the window of opportunity 
given to it by formulating a policy to tackle global warming, but it crucially chose an 
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unacceptable procedure for attaining its policy goal: taxation. This proved to be the 
incorrect choice for three reasons. Firstly, some member states saw this as an intrusion 
into their jealously guarded right of discretionary taxation, and thus sought to prevent 
any move on this area on ideological grounds. Secondly, industry was suspicious of 
this process and lobbied member state governments accordingly, eager to evade any 
extra fiscal burdens which might eat into their competitiveness. Finally, the imposition 
of new taxes at a time of considerable economic troubles, for a preventive, rather than 
an ameliorative measure, was seen by many as the Commission acting in institutional 
self-interest (Jordan, et al, 2003), and thus moving a Trojan horse into areas of new 
competence.  
 
What this means is that they feared the Commission was involved in a 
publicity campaign, through which new revenues generated by this procedure could be 
put to work to fund environmental programmes with the Commission’s “stamp” on it, 
generating ‘output legitimacy’ (Dobson and Weale, 2003) in the process. Therefore, 
the Commission failed, as it did not take into account the fear of the member states of 
the path dependence they could enter into if they allowed the Commission this 
competence. When it comes to budgetary or fiscal measures, the rationalist logic of 
consequences quickly comes to the fore as member states engage in agreeing on 
‘grand bargains (Laffan and Lindner, 2005: 196). Accordingly, a rationalist approach 
can provide an insight into the failure of this stillborn policy. 
 
5.2.3 ‘Re-opening’ the Window of Opportunity: the Kyoto 
Negotiations 
 
The importance of ideas in setting the agenda for action in such a technically complex 
sector as climate policy, has been noted in Section 5.1. Nevertheless, external 
impulses (Wettestad, 2005: 2) can also play a role in reigniting interest in tackling a 
particular collective action problem such as climate change. They can also provide a 
venue for transferring ideas on how to tackle the aforementioned problems (Dolowitz 
and Marsh, 2000). This is the role the Kyoto Negotiations played in ‘re-opening’ the 
window of opportunity for policy formulation. 
 
The negotiations that took place in Kyoto in 1997 over a global agreement to 
tackle climate change pitted two policy paradigms against each other: the EU’s ‘risk 
prevention leadership’, against the US’ ‘free-market environmentalism’ (Damro and 
Luaces, 2003). The EU attended in the hope of acting as a global leader on this issue, 
and sought to export its policy strategy into the global arena, that is, regulatory 
measures to mitigate environmental risk (ibid). The US, on the other hand, sought to 
avoid burdensome commitments that could potentially damage its powerful and 
influential petroleum and automotive sectors, so it brought the concept of emissions 
trading to the table. The EU was sceptical of this policy as, deployed in tandem with 
the other two proposed “flexibility mechanisms”, the CDM and JI, it allowed big 
industries in developed states to buy their way out of their commitments (Yamin, 
1998).  
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Consequently, a ‘package deal’ (Moravcsik, 1998) was struck in which the EU 
agreed to the inclusion of these flexibility mechanisms, in return for which it was 
permitted to implement the Protocol collectively; it also obtained the inclusion of 
fixed emissions targets and concrete timetables (Yamin, 1998). Therefore, the Kyoto 
Protocol ‘exported’ the idea of emissions trading from the US10 to the EU. 
Nevertheless, the EU was not obliged to use this policy to reduce their emissions, as 
Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol (which deals with emissions trading), states ‘the 
parties included in Annex B [developed countries] may participate in emissions 
trading for the purposes of fulfilling their commitments under Article 3’ (my italics).  
 
Accordingly, the Kyoto Protocol had the dual of effect of ‘re-opening’ the 
window of opportunity as, despite the numerous criticisms levelled at it, it comprised 
a landmark in global co-operation, following up the UNFCCC with concrete 
commitments to reducing GHG emissions. It therefore provided new impetus to the 
activities of the Commission in this policy area, and had the unintended consequence 
of seeding a new policy idea into the European environmental policy-making 
paradigm, through a process of horizontal policy transfer. Impetus was provided to a 
logic of appropriate action, giving it an advantage over a logic of pandering to the 
lowest common denominator of domestic interests, as the EU now had concrete 
emissions reductions to meet, by 2012. Thus, change was in the offing for the pattern 
of policy-making in this sector. 
 
5.2.4 Formulating the ETS: From part of a broader strategy to Green 
Paper 
 
The formulation of the ETS was underscored by its status as a ‘new idea’ in the EU 
arena, to tackle a relatively new collective problem. In this scenario, the hand of the 
policy entrepreneur, or formulator of the policy, is considerably strengthened 
(Coleman and Tangermann, 1999), as is the importance of the idea in itself. Therefore, 
member state interests are somewhat subdued in this stage of the policy-making 
process, due to the novelty and accompanying technical complexity of the new 
formula (Alchian, in Haas, 1992: 14). Nevertheless, collective action problems, such 
as the need for concessions to the most antagonistic member states, would be stored 
up for debate in the implementation process, to which the disagreements are often 
transferred, as member states learn more about the consequences of implementing the 
new policy, as will be analysed below. 
 
The first mention of emissions trading as a possible option for EU collective 
action appeared in the Commission Communication “Climate Change: Towards a 
post-Kyoto Strategy”, published in 1998 (Wettestad, 2005: 3). A year later, it 
appeared again in the Commission’s Communication on “Preparing for 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol”. However, there was no specific design laid 
                                                 
10 Where it had been implemented, with relative success, to tackle the US’ problem with SO2 
emissions, responsible for acid rain, as a provision in the Clean Air Act, 1990 (www.epa.gov). 
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out for a putative ETS scheme until the publication of the Commission Green Paper 
on GHG emissions trading within the EU, in 2000 (ibid). Three analytical points must 
be made in relation to this Green Paper. In formulating the scheme, it constantly 
referred to the “cost effectiveness” of the policy11. This reflected the general turn 
towards what was termed “economisation” above. In other words, it sought to 
underline the economic bona fides of its activities in this field, thus perhaps seeking to 
distance itself from the commonly held conception that it was a stifling regulator. 
Furthermore, the actual choice of instrument, straight out the American free-market 
environmentalism model, was a double guarantee for the Commission in this regard. 
 
Secondly, the language of the Green Paper reflected in many ways a policy 
document published by the Center for Clean Air Policy, an American environmental 
think tank, based in Washington, DC, in 199912. This clearly displays two more 
processes in action: the influence of external epistemic communities, and their role in 
passing on the baton of new policy ideas; in this case, horizontally from the US polity 
to the heart of the Europolity, to a receptive audience: indeed, Wettestad cites the 
internal driver in the Commission towards emissions trading as being Peter Zapfel, 
who had studied it in the US (Wettestad, 2005: 12). Additionally, it displays the 
‘promiscuousness’ (Mazey and Richardson, 2001) of the Commission in inviting 
submissions such as these, and the potential influence this grants relatively small 
epistemic communities in the policy-making process.  
 
Finally, the Commission was seen to advocate certain ideas such as 
harmonisation of implementation, that is, of the rules of monitoring, reporting and 
verification (Commission, 2000: 5), and as a follow up to this it set up the debate on 
the relative merits of “grandfathering” versus auctioning, as a method of allocating 
pollution permits (ibid: 18-19). Harmonisation entailed a greater role for the 
Commission, thus strengthening its position and furthering its institutional interests in 
the process. Grandfathering entails the recognition of the historical right to pollute, 
and therefore companies are granted free allocations under this system; auctioning, on 
the other hand, distributes permits under the “polluter pays” principle (ibid: 18). The 
Commission appeared to favour auctioning over grandfathering (Commission Green 
Paper, 2000: 18); however, it suggested a mixed system might be the most 
appropriate. This debate would inform the final decision-making process, setting the 
scene for inter-institutional bargaining between the Commission, the EP and the 
Council, and subsequently would provide ammunition for the critique of the ETS at 
the policy evaluation stage.  
 
From a theoretical perspective, what we can see here happening is an 
increasing logic of appropriateness forming in the Commission, as it learned its lesson 
from the failure of the Carbon tax directive. Therefore, the Commission itself was 
shepherding the process from the ideas stage to the bargaining stage, preparing the 
                                                 
11 Cost-effectiveness was used over ten times in the course of the 28 page document. 
12 cf Design of a Practical Approach to Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Combined with Policies and 
Measures in the EC. 
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ground for a shift in the logic driving the process. Let us now see how this process 
unfolded. 
 
5.2.5 Deciding on the ETS: an “ultra-quick pregnancy” 
 
In line with the formulation process, the Commission dominated the decision-making 
process, as it had a massive informational advantage over the EP and the member 
states. This, combined with the need to have the Directive published by late 2003 at 
the latest, led to what Wettestad describes as an ‘ultra-quick pregnancy’ (Wettestad, 
2005: 3). Only proposed in October 2001, it was published as a Directive in October 
2003.  
 
There was some minor wrangling amongst the different institutions over the 
content of the Directive. The EP, perhaps overwhelmed by the technical detail, tabled 
relatively few amendments. Nevertheless, in relation to the method of allocation 
(which would turn out to be the main problem with the First Phase of the ETS) it 
sought to raise the threshold of auctioning to 15% of the total permits (ibid: 6). The 
Council, in its Common Position, sought 100% grandfathering, perhaps reflecting the 
lobbying efforts of domestic industy. However, there was a split in the Council, as 
Austria, Finland, Denmark and Sweden favoured more auctioning, whereas other 
countries, notably Germany, favoured less (ibid: 13). The final agreed percentage was 
a mere 5%, the rest being “grandfathered”, or handed out for free (ibid: 6). As regards 
the scope of the scheme, the EP favoured a broader scope covering as large a swathe 
of industry as possible. The Council, predictably enough, favoured a narrower scope, 
reflecting the Commission’s proposal to start narrowly and expand in future phases 
(ibid: 7). Similarly predictable differences arose in other areas relating to compliance 
and linkage with the other flexibility mechanisms, which had the effect of making 
emissions reductions far easier than expected, or than would be credibly believed, thus 
creating problems in the carbon market (ibid: 7). 
 
The decision-making process highlights three analytical points which were 
discussed previously in this paper: namely, in situations of great uncertainty and 
technical difficulty, interests play a lesser role, and the influence of ideas increase 
(Haas, 1992). Therefore, the Commission, having learned the policy from the US, 
stood in the best position to kick-start the decision-making process. This maintained a 
relatively strong influence supporting the broader ideational goal, which represented a 
change to what occurred in the case of the carbon tax proposal.  
 
Secondly, outside influence can often coerce policy transfer into taking place, 
diminishing the influence of state interests (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000): the need to 
meet Kyoto commitments, the failure to come up with concrete policies (cf carbon 
tax), and the need to show global leadership in the context of the US’ unilateral 
withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, forced the hands of even the most 
sceptical member states, who included Germany amongst their number (ibid: 16). The 
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time factor was crucial as well, as the 2005 deadline for implementing the Kyoto 
Protocol entailed that agreement needed to be reached by the end of 2003 at the latest. 
 
Finally, the small concessions made by the Commission, catering to sceptical 
member state interests, in the rush to have the final wording decided upon, along with 
member state confusion as to the implications of certain segments of the Directive, 
stored up problems for the implementation stage, as will be seen below. It was perhaps 
a classic example of the “Devil in the detail”.  
 
To conclude this section, the ETS decision-making process was notable for 
being ideas-driven, with the Commission acting as the ideational entrepreneur, 
possibly also out of a desire to generate more output legitimacy (Dobson and Weale, 
2003) for itself13, in the context of the broader need to act to comply with Kyoto 
commitments. Nevertheless, member states interests did play a small, but influential, 
role in shaping the final document, a role which was arguably deleterious, as will be 
seen in the two following parts of this case study. This perhaps reflects the nature of 
the system itself, in which the existence of so many dissenting voices can often lead to 
a policy, which is badly designed, and not far away from the status quo. Therefore, the 
historical factor was influential here as well, as the system is designed to prevent any 
radical policy-making, due to its numerous checks and balances. 
 
5.3 Implementing and Evaluating the ETS 
 
Now that the development of the ETS has been accounted for, it remains to discuss the 
implementation and subsequent evaluation of the policy, as this will offer clues into 
the use of this new market-building method in the field of environmental policy, and 
what this has entailed for the development of this policy sector as a whole within the 
EU. 
 
5.3.1 Implementing the ETS: the National Allocation Plans 
 
The first salient point is that the implementation of the ETS proceeded rapidly in 
preparation for the start-up of the scheme on January 1, 2005. It could be argued that 
due to these time constraints, the First Phase was somewhat damaged in its 
implementation. Two factors seemed to govern the implementation. The overriding 
principle seemed to be member state discretion, as each one was given considerable 
leeway in terms of grandfathering14, use of the other flexibility mechanisms, and, 
most crucially of all, the final decision on an absolute cap on emissions (cf Directive 
2003/87/EC). The complex, technical nature of this legislation thus left a lot of work 
to be done for member states, but also left a lot of room for industry to lobby on minor 
                                                 
13 Cf Information and Communication Strategy for the EU, 2002. 
14 In fact, only three countries reported auctioning permits – Denmark, Ireland and Hungary 
(PriceWaterhouse Coopers Report: 2006: 24). 
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technical points, which could subsequently have major repercussions. The principal 
clue as to how the member state interests’ overrode the necessary ideational force 
behind the original legislation, precipitating a policy failure can be seen in the way 
caps were imposed from state to state (cf National Allocation Plans (NAPs) for First 
Phase of ETS, 2004). 
 
Some member states have more energy-intensive industry than others, as can 
be seen in the percentage share of total GHG emissions that ETS covered for each 
state. A summary of the NAPs, along with these percentages, taken from 
Georgopoulou et al, (2006), will be included in the Appendix 1. But one thing that can 
be noted is that certain member states had more to gain or lose in terms of overall 
economic competitiveness, by being strict or lenient on when allocating allowances to 
their domestic industry. For instance, in the EU-15, the ETS shares vary from a low of 
24% for France and Luxembourg, to a high of 53% for Germany and Finland 
(Georgopoulou, et al, 2006: 4023). Therefore, there was significant leeway and 
incentives built into the system to reward a “generous” approach to allowance 
allocation. 
 
Furthermore, there were insufficient controls or penalties in place to control 
member states from going over and above the actual recorded emissions, thus not even 
keeping in line with the “cap” part of cap and trade. It seems that this permissive 
climate contributed to the member states’ erring on the side of “generosity”, as was 
revealed in a 2004 report by environmental consultancy firm Ecofys, which found that 
NAPs often exceeded the actual emissions of the entire industrial sector covered by 
the ETS, therefore granting the industries in question free ‘hot air’ to sell on the 
carbon markets (Ecofys, 2004: 6). As the report concluded about the first phase of 
implementation: 
 
With some exceptions, the caps imposed on the EU ETS participants are less 
strict than would be required if these sectors were to make an equal contribution to 
meeting Kyoto targets as other sectors, such as transport or home heating (Ecofys, 
2004: 6). 
 
Therefore, it seemed that the implementation of the ETS had the unintended 
consequence of permitting heavy-emitting industry shirk their responsibility towards 
national and EU-wide attainment of the Kyoto targets. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, what do these occurrences tell us about the 
organisational logics at work in this process? It seems that the lack of clear, 
transparent and detailed allocation guidelines opened the door for significant free 
riding. Therefore, member states resorted to an instrumentally rationalist logic in the 
absence of set rules, norms and procedures, reflecting the novelty and weak 
institutionalisation of the ETS. In the situation of diminished information (the actual 
verifiable emissions of each member state were no more than good estimates, due to 
the novelty of the procedure (Georgopoulou, et al, 2005)), with insufficient guarantees 
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that other member states would be strict in their allocations, national governments 
were rationally generous with their allocations to their domestic industry. 
 
5.3.2 Evaluation 
 
The implementation was thus a rushed, sup-optimal stage of the policy process. But 
what can this tell us about the pattern of policy-making? It seems that the problems 
with implementation might reflect what Dolowitz and Marsh called ‘uninformed’ and 
‘incomplete’ transfer (see above). The former refers to the fact that the policy was 
transferred under conditions of insufficient information: there appeared to be some 
confusion over exact levels and appropriate caps to impose, as mentioned above 
(Georgopoulou, et al, 2005); the latter to the fact that the administrative apparatus was 
not the same as its blueprint model across the Atlantic. For instance, the 
groundbreaking ETS initiated by the US Federal Government to address the issue of 
SO2 emissions was centrally developed, implemented and administered 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers Report, 2007: 42), therefore a single market was built from 
scratch in a coherent manner by a single administrator. Yet, in the EU ETS, EU-wide 
standards for verification were not implemented (ibid, 2007: 24). Questions remain 
unanswered about the appropriateness of such a market-based measure in a system of 
governance such as the EU, where the policy formulators in the Commission have 
relatively little power of oversight compared to their counterparts in the US Federal 
Environmental Protection Agency. There is thus considerable scope for free-riding 
built into the system.  
 
Accordingly, the analytical value of the institutionalist approach is clear to be 
seen here. Insufficient learning, and the short timeframe for implementation, 
contributed to the implementation of a sub-optimal policy. Combined with this, the 
weak institutionalisation of the policy, with its tentative controls, left considerable 
scope for free-riding by member states concerned that they would be imposing too 
harsh a limit on their domestic industry. The legislative basis of the EU in the area of 
environmental policy is traditionally regulatory in nature (Sbragia, 1999), so the issue 
of polity is relevant here: there is arguably insufficient bureaucratic and legal capacity 
in the EU to administer such a system, unless the rules of the game are changed. 
 
Now it is appropriate to refer the two empirical proofs of this outcome. The 
first hint as to the structural problems which beset the ETS lies in the collapse in the 
price of traded CO2 in May of 2006, as the market got wind of the over-allocations, as 
member states were drawing up new NAPs for Phase II which is to begin in 2008 (The 
Economist, 2006a). As the Economist put it at the time,  
 
Unfortunately, the numbers reflect not the scheme's success in cutting 
pollution, but industry's success in getting itself allocated more permits than actual 
emissions warranted when the scheme was launched (The Economist, May 6 2006: 
83). 
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Carbon prices, having hit a high of 30 euros per tonne in early 2005, are, as of 
May 14, 2007, at a miniscule 0.33 euro per tonne (www.carbon.com). The market 
does not lie in relation to the level of permits allocated then. 
 
Secondly, as full reports of actual verified emissions are being published as a 
part of the assessment of NAPs for Phase II (2008-2012), it is becoming clear that the 
markets were correct in turning away from CO2 permits, as supply completely 
overtook demand. This can be seen in the Appendix section, as only four countries out 
of the 21 assessed so far, emitted more than what they were permitted (Austria, 
Ireland, Italy and Spain) and in the case of the first three, the difference was marginal. 
On the other hand, some member states dramatically oversupplied industry with 
permits. For instance, Poland allocated 239.1 megatonnes (Mt) for 2005, whereas its 
verified emissions for that year only came to 203.1 Mt; France allocated 156.5 Mt, 
and only emitted 131.3 Mt; finally, to prove that it was not only Eastern and Southern 
states who were being creative with the figures, Sweden allocated 22.9, whereas it 
only emitted 19.3 (Commission Press Release, May 4, 2007: 3). This had the effect of, 
as The Economist (2006b) says, of handing participating industries, especially power 
generation  
 
wads of cash: they simply passed the extra costs on to consumers and pocketed the 
money. According to a report by IPA Energy Consulting, Britain's power-generation 
sector alone made a profit of around pounds 800m ($1.5 billion) from the scheme in its 
first year (The Economist, Sept 9, 2006). 
 
There is some hope for the next phase, however, as better information, 
combined with a more focused amending Directive (2004/101/EC) which has 
strengthened the Commission’s hand when it comes to rejecting submitted NAPs, 
means that there is possibly a process of learning and socialisation going on at the 
current time, which in due process might lead to a more optimal policy output. 
Nevertheless, working from the basis of what has transpired in the First Phase, we can 
see that a substantive change in policy-making in the environmental sector of the EU, 
with the use of a market instrument to achieve emission reduction commitments, has 
not been matched with a procedural change in how policy-making is done in this 
sector, as the numerous checks and balances, and the distant relationship between 
formulation and implementation on the ground, has led to a sub-optimal policy output. 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper has outlined the sequencing of different logics in the emergence of the ETS 
as a concrete policy output. It has demonstrated that integrating institutionalist 
perspectives (Olsen, 2002) is of theoretical value in coming to an understanding of 
this sequencing. This provides scope for further research programmes along these 
lines, to account for the different sequences of predominant logics in other policy 
areas within the EU. 
 
It appeared that the ETS represented a crucial break in the predominantly 
regulatory field of environmental policy-making. However, on analysing the influence 
of historical factors related to the make-up the polity itself, it has been shown that the 
‘loose coupling’ (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch, 2004: 103) between the Commission 
and the national implementing authorities, in keeping with the historical necessity for 
a certain room for manoeuvre for national governments, has led to the unintended 
consequence of a give-away of allowances to domestic industry, thus undermining the 
new policy experiment. There is the related factor that the polity is arguably not yet 
prepared or designed for deploying such a large-scale market-building measure as the 
ETS, as administrative power is not sufficiently centralised to guarantee standard 
implementation across the Union, in contrast to the US. This has the result that the 
policy transfer from one polity to the next is both ‘incomplete’ and ‘inappropriate’ 
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). The ideational role of policy entrepreneurs such as the 
Commission is thus diluted somewhat by this historical factor, that is, the checks and 
balances which make policy-making such a multi-actor process in the EU. 
 
Ideas play a key role in such technical policy areas as environmental policy. 
Substantively, the influence of epistemic communities (Haas, 1992) in setting the 
agenda for political action has been proven to be significant in the case of climate 
policy. Concerned scientists, who used their technical expertise to constitute the 
preferences of policymakers, in this case, drove the Commission to devise a plan of 
action, thus putting the issue firmly on the agenda. The influence of ideational causal 
factors such as these were predominant in the early stages of the process, as general 
problems were framed by these experts.  
 
Procedurally, ideas were also of importance. The initial reflex of the 
Commission to propose a carbon tax proved to be a significant error. In light of this, 
and in the broader context of the Kyoto Protocol, a new instrument came to the 
attention of the Commission, that of emissions trading. Therefore, the idea was seeded 
into the European policy paradigm by the horizontal transfer of this policy from the 
American setting to the European setting, facilitated by the provision in Article 17 of 
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the Kyoto Protocol. Accordingly, a logic of action grounded in the advocacy of a new 
policy idea informed the formulation stage of the policy-making process. 
 
In line with the points made about ideas above, the sheer complexity of the 
new policy instrument led many states to become quite muted in advocating their 
interests, even in the decision-making stage. In fact, it was the Commission, who had 
an informational advantage over member states due in main part to its ‘promiscuous’ 
(Mazey and Richardson, 2001) dealings with epistemic communities, who sought to 
further its institutional self-interest by appearing to be the driving force behind the 
scheme. However, member states advocated their own interests in some seemingly at 
the time small issues such as in the case of the final method of allocation, permitting 
considerable room for manoeuvre in the subsequent implementation phases. In this 
phase, the role of state interest and a rationalist behavioural logic was clear to see, as 
states sought to diminish the risk that domestic industry might incur over burdensome 
costs, which would affect its competitiveness.  
 
In the final analysis, a broad-based institutionalist account is of utility in 
displaying the dynamic interaction between these different logics at different stages of 
the policy-making process of the ETS. It provides an insight of how a good idea can 
be unintentionally turned into a sub-optimal policy output, due to the novelty of such a 
policy in a polity which has such a multitude of actors have so many opportunities to 
water down the original plan, and in which the link between formulator and 
implementer is weak. Nevertheless, the ETS is in its relative infancy, so it represents a 
commencement of a collective effort of some sort to tackle the issue of climate change 
using the idea of the market. Accordingly, it offers rich potential for opening a new 
pathway of environmental policy-making in the EU.  
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Appendix II 
Summary information on the 21 plans assessed to date: 
Approved allowances for 2005-2007, verified emissions in 2005, proposed caps for 
2008-2012, approved caps for 2008-2012, additional emissions covered in 2008 to 
2012 and limit on the use of credits from emission-saving projects in third countries. 
Member State 1st period 
cap 
2005 
verified 
emissions 
Proposed 
cap 2008-
2012 
Cap allowed 
2008-2012 
Additional 
emissions in 
2008-2012 15
JI/CDM limit 
2008-2012 in 
% 16
Austria 33.0 33.4 32.8 30.7 0.35 10 
Belgium 62.1 55.5817 63.3 58.5 5.0 8.4 
Czech Rep. 97.6 82.5 101.9 86.8 n.a. 10 
Estonia 19 12.62 24.38 12.72 0.31 0 
France 156.5 131.3 132.8 132.8 5.1 13.5 
Hungary 31.3 26.0 30.7 26.9 1.43 10 
Germany 499 474 482 453.1 11.0 12 
Greece 74.4 71.3 75.5 69.1 n.a. 9 
Ireland 22.3 22.4 22.6 21.15 n.a. 21.91 
Italy  223.1 225.5 209 195.8 n.k.18 14.99 
Latvia 4.6 2.9 7.7 3.3 n.a. 5 
Lithuania 12.3 6.6 16.6 8.8 0.05 8.9 
Luxembourg 3.4 2.6 3.95 2.7 n.a. 10 
Malta 2.9 1.98 2.96 2.1 n.a. tbd 
Netherlands 95.3 80.35 90.4 85.8 4.0 10 
Poland 239.1 203.1 284.6 208.5 6.3 10 
Slovakia 30.5 25.2 41.3 30.9 1.7 7 
Slovenia 8.8 8.7 8.3 8.3 n.a. 15.76 
Spain 174.4 182.9 152.7 152.3 6.7
19 ca. 20 
Sweden 22.9 19.3 25.2 22.8 2.0 10 
UK 245.3 242.420 246.2 246.2 9.5 8 
SUM 2057.8 1910.6621 2054.92 1859.27 53.44 - 
Source: Emissions trading. IP/07/667 
                                                 
15  The figures indicated in this column comprise emissions in installations that come under the coverage of the 
scheme in 2008 to 2012 due to an extended scope applied by the Member State and do not include new installations 
entering the scheme in sectors already covered in the first trading period. 
16  The JI/CDM limit is expressed as a percentage of the member state’s cap and indicates the maximum extent to 
which companies may surrender JI or CDM credits instead of EU ETS allowances to cover their emissions. These 
credits are generated by emission-saving projects carried out in third countries under the Kyoto Protocol’s project-
based flexible mechanisms, known as Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
17  Including installations which Belgium opted to exclude temporarily from the scheme in 2005 
18  Italy has to include further installations. The amount of additional emissions is not known at this stage. 
19  Additional installations and emissions of over 6 million tonnes are already included as of 2006. 
20  Verified emissions for 2005 do not include installations which the UK opted to exclude temporarily from the 
scheme in 2005 but which will be covered in 2008 to 2012 and are estimated to amount to some 30 Mt. 
21  The sum of verified emissions for 2005 does not include installations which the UK opted to exclude temporarily 
from the scheme in 2005 but which will be covered in 2008 to 2012 and are estimated to amount to some 30 Mt. 
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